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BAR BRIEFS
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
BY A. ANGUS
State of N. Dak. v. Lacy. Tom Lacy was convicted in District
Court of violating the prohibition law. On appeal, he alleges error
in the rulings of the Court, particularly in the admission in evidence
of the statements of one Wright, the state's principal witness. The
evidence showed that Wright was not a police officer, that he had
searched the Defendant forcibly without a search warrant, and that
he had then found a can of alcohol. HELD: 'When one obtains
evidence through illegal search and seizure, which evidence tends to
prove that Defendant committed an offense, such evidence is admis-
sible.
-0-
State of North Dakota v. Mutschler. Defendant was convicted
of the crime of arson on an information which omitted the statu-
tory word "malicious", but alleged that defendant "wilfully, un-
lawfully, and feloniously" set fire to a building. A motion for
arrest of judgment on the ground that the complaint did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, was denied. Denial
of this motion is here assigned as error. HELD: Error. The in-
formation does not state a public offense since it fails to allege
"malice" as required by statute. A motion for arrest of judgment
is sufficient to arrest judgment on an information which does not state
a public offense.
0
Barbnecht v. Great Northern Railway Company. Plaintiff sued
the Defendant railway company to recover damages for injury caused
her through the alleged misconduct of a porter on one of Defendant's
trains. She asserted that he "insulted and attacked" her, causing
her mental pain, etc. At the trial only insults were proved, and this
appeal is taken on the ground of error in the court's instructions to
the jury in the use of the word "assault". HELD: Where a com-
plaint sets forth two causes of action and fails to substantiate one
of them, it is sufficient if it substantiates the other. Where the jury
has been influenced by the misuse of words, the Court will not reverse,
but will order a reduction of damages.
-0
Heegard v. Kopka. Defendant executed a third mortgage on
certain land to Plaintiff as security for a loan, with the understand-
ing that the first and second mortgages would be discharged out of
the proceeds of the loan. Plaintiff later paid the first mortgage
debt but the loan was insufficient to pay the second mortgage debt.
Plaintiff sues to foreclose the first mortgage, claiming as subrogees,
or assignees. Defendant Nordahl, holder of the second mortgage,
asserted title under mortgage foreclosure which he claimed was
superior to Plaintiff's mortgage. HELD: Rights of holder df
second mortgage were superior to Plaintiff's. Plaintiff discharged the
first mortgage debt by payment thereof, and is not an assignee. The
doctrine of equitable subrogation will not be invoked in this case
because Plaintiff had allowed the holder of the second mortgage,
to bid in for the full amount of the claim thus discharging the third
mortgage under the belief that the first mortgage was already dis-
charged.
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State ex rel Holter v. Olsness. The State obtained a deed to
certain land on May 3 and the Bank of North Dakota thereafter
leased the land to Plaintiff. Plaintiff insured the crops in the State
Hail Insurance Department, loss Was sustained by hail, and adjustment
was made and certified to the State Hail Department. The Com-
missioner refused to certify to the State Auditor' The Code pro-
vides that land subject to the State Hail Insurance Act consist of tax-
able lands. The Constitution exempts state owned lands from taxa-
tion. Plaintiff contends that the Hail Insurance Act was intended
to be applicable to all lands which produced crops, the question of
ownership of property being unimportant. HELD: The law makes
taxability the test of insurability. Here the land was exempt from
taxation before the insurance contract became absolute. Therefore
the crop was not insurable at the time of the loss.
0-
Pfaffengut v. Insurance Company. Plaintiff bought an auto-
mobile on the installment plan, giving a chattel mortgage which was
assigned to the Commercial Credit Trust. Plaintiff secured an in-
surance policy from the Export Insurance Co., on this automobile,
which policy provided that the loss should be payable to the holder
of the chattel mortgage and also provided that if there was any other
insurance on the property at the time of the loss, the policy would
be void. Plaintiff secured a policy from the Home Fire Insurance
Company. The automobile was destroyed by fire. The Export In-
surance Company refused to pay Plaintiff on the ground that the
property was covered by another company, but later paid the Com-
mercial Credit Trust and took an assignment of the mortgage. The
Home Fire Insurance Co. made an adjustment of the loss and issued
a draft to Plaintiff and the Commercial Credit Trust jointly. Plain-
tiff brings two actions, one to recover on the policy of insurance from
the Export Insurance Co., and the other, to determine the rights of
the parties to the Draft issued in settlement of the second policy of in-
surance. HELD: Defendant waived its right to avoid the policy be-
cause it did not tender the unearned premium upon learning that
Plaintiff had insured in another company. Such a provision in the
policy made it voidable, not void.
-0-
Rouse v. Zimmerman & Reite. Zimmerman gave a first mortgage
on certain of his land to the Federal Land Bank, St. Paul, a second
mortgage to Defendant Reite, and a third mortgage to Plaintiff. The
Federal Land Bank began foreclosure of its first mortgage and De-
fendant to prevent foreclosure paid said bank the amount for which
the mortgage was being foreclosed and accrued costs. Plaintiff then
foreclosed its third mortgage and received a sheriff's deed. Plain-
tiff paid three subsequent installments to the Federal Land Bank.
Defendant Reite foreclosed his second mortgage and secured the
sheriff's deed and refused, upon demand of Plaintiff, to reimburse
Plaintiff for payments made on the first mortgage to the Federal
Land Bank. Plaintiff commenced this action to secure decree that
Plaintiff was subrogated to rights, liens, and equities of the Federal
Land Bank on its first mortgage to the amount paid by Plaintiff to
the Bank. Defendant claimed that whe:. Plaintiff foreclosed his own
mortgage, he merged in the deed whatever right he may have had to
subrogation, and that Plaintiff had not purchased the' first mortgage
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in its entirety. HELD: Plaintiff holder of third mortgage is entitled
to be subrogated to rights under the first mortgage to the extent of his
payments as against intervening second mortgagor, even though he
has foreclosed his second mortgage and received sheriff's deed, in
absence of proof showing an intention to merge the estates. It was
not necessary to Plaintiff holder of the second mortgage to pay in-
stallments due in the future. Each installment is a separate debt and
.it is sufficient if he pays installments due on the debts for which he
claims the right of subrogation.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DECISIONS
An injury is received in the course of employment when it
comes while the period of the employment at a place where the em-
ployee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties and while
he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental
thereto; and where a day coal loader is killed while working in a
mine at night solely for his own purpose and convenience he did not
sustain the injury in the course of employment.-Consolidation Coal
Co. vs. Ratliff, 288 S. W. 1057 (Ky. Dec. 1926).
-0
The Commission adopted the following rules of proof in hernia
cases: (i) That the immediate cause is sudden effort, strain or
blow; (2) That descent of hernia occurred immediately following;
(3) that it was accompanied or immediately followed by severe pain
in hernial region; (4) that same was noticed and fact communicated
to one or more persons at once; but court held that while the Com-
mission was not to be bound by ordinary rules of evidence or technical
rules of procedure, it had no authority to make the foregoing rules
in absence of specific delegation by the legislature. Livingston vs
Industrial Commission, 251 Pac. 368 (Utah, Nov. 1926).
-0-
Conflicting parts of statute: (i) "The percentage of perman-
ent disability caused by any injury shall be so computed as to cover
the permanent disability caused by that particular injury without
reference to any injury previously suffered or any permanent dis-
ability caused thereby; (2) "Whenever this act, or any part or
section thereof, is interpreted by a court, it shall be liberally construed
by such court with the purpose of extending the benefits of the act
for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employ-
ment;" were construed in case where employee lost his remaining
eye through industrial accident. The Commission allowed for loss of
one eye, but court held he was entitled to compensation for total
permanent disability.-Liptak vs Industrial Commission, 251 Pac. 635
(Cal. Dec. 1926).
0--
A town board paid various farmers who presented themselves with
team and wagon for hauling gravel to gravel a town road. The board
provided the gravel pit and supervised the loading, designated the
place of unloading, but later required the farmers to select their own
checker and pit boss and to pay for dynamite. Pay was by the load
so that it was immaterial how fast or how slowly the men worked.
After the ground froze the "nen were told they must assume the
risks incident to the work, as it appeared dangerous to the town
officers to undermine the frozen ground. One of the men was
